



Text

[Begin recording]

[Saddam] How can you be sure that the information on the chemical file with the Iraqis is solid and that Ekeus will not be able to create a problem over this file and use it as an excuse to say the biological file was settled in 1993, but when pressure was again used on the Iraqis they revealed new information? So this will not prevent it from becoming a precedent, making it easy for the listener to believe Ekeus if he raises any new situation concerning all the programs, in which he has room for maneuvering. Let us now listen to Amir [Rashid].

[Rashid] Sir, regarding the biological file, we have a defense plan and I will put your Excellency in the full picture. There were several speculations on its success; some said 70 percent and others 50 percent, depending on the sections. We actually defended it. But right now, Sir, Ekeus is concentrating his efforts on the biological issue. The Special Commission is concentrating on the biological file. Meanwhile, time is passing. That allowed it within a few weeks to obtain and verify information, for our story is not genuine.

[Saddam, interrupting] Are you being influenced by the biological file or considering another issue?

[Rashid] No, Sir, allow me to say that the file had a basis. The missile and chemical files no longer have any basis of any value. The biological file had a basis that made it easy to suspect and concentrate on to know everything about it. But if someone did not have any basis, he can concentrate all the effort he wants and still not come out with any result.

In the biological field, he [Ekeus] now has a solid ground against us, actually. The biological file has now been adopted by the Security Council members. I regret to say that we are responsible for what happened on this issue. We want to succeed. We succeeded in some sections when we went to Russia and convinced the Russians on certain creative calculations.

[Saddam] What would you say if the Russians said you are revealing new information?

[Rashid] Yes, I will answer this soon, may God preserve and protect you, Sir. So what do I say, Sir: With the existence of our story, there is no hope to remove the technical obstacle to the implementation of Paragraph 22. The Security Council members now are unanimous with Ekeus on this subject.

Let us go back to the subject. The hardships raised by your Excellency, sir, are, without exaggeration, consuming us day and night. They disturb us, confuse us, and even affect our main job. This subject, Sir, calls for the involvement of everyone. It is a loss, a loss.

It is possible to come out with a positive result and with a higher percentage; say, 70 or 80 percent. We may have to sit down with you, Sir, to calculate it and arrange it, God willing.

Without this, Sir, the possibility of coming out with any result on Paragraph 22 is zero. This is what I would like to say, Sir.

[Saddam] Yes Tariq [Aziz]?

[Aziz] Sir, Lieutenant General Amir raised a point on the 10 April debate in the Security Council and the questions that we gave to the council members, but which they did not raise. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that there is no biological file in the whole story; in other words, there is no biological file in Ekeus's work. Ekeus submitted his report on the chemical missiles and the monitoring, and the IAEA submitted its report on the nuclear aspect.

Let me say again that I rarely use the word sure, but I now say that I am 99.9 percent sure that the French and the Russians were presenting their plan on the basis of this report. Why was the Ekeus report not discussed thoroughly and why were the questions not raised? This is for two reasons. First, bad luck. On 10 and 11 [month and year not given], the Security Council agenda was very heavy. I mean, when they met in the morning to hear the Ekeus report...

[Saddam, interrupting] It could have been deliberate.

[Aziz] No, Sir, as I said last time, work in the Security Council is so packed that some files are not given sufficient time. But, when there is insistence for more time, the French, the Russians, and the Chinese say the debate can be continued the following week.

Ekeus came and presented his report. They said: We heard it and we will discuss it tomorrow. The discussion the following day was also short. The other thing that confused the Ekeus report was the draft resolution that was to be discussed at the same time. The third thing, which was the most important, was the frustration of Russia and France over the biological file because of a big gap, due to which they could not proceed with it. It was for this reason that they did not raise the questions.

Lt Gen Amir will recall that they raised similar questions we had submitted in the past. I mean, in March and January. In the past, we always educate them and then tell them:

Ask Ekeus this and that question. They do not ask him the questions exactly as submitted to them, but they do ask him. They ask and bombard Ekeus with questions, and he is compelled to answer.

The existence of a big gap in the biological file made the Russians and the French say: There is no need to proceed, as the time will come for these questions. But is there anything left threatening security and stability? So long as there is this big gap, the French consider this issue as ruled out. Once the big gap is resolved the question will be raised.

Therefore, I say that had there not been a biological file, everything that is left in the previous files, such as the points raised by Ekeus, would not have constituted a major obstacle.

There is something, Sir, which you know from a distance, and we all know also, as it contains the answer to the question: Will anything be raised after three or six months from now on the chemical or missile file?

Sir, since 1993, July 1993, when the leadership was instructed to cooperate technically with Ekeus and the technical committees, these people did a hell of a job. This is how I describe it. Ekeus did not miss a single thing, a lie, or data without raising it, and they discussed it with him and resolved them.

Therefore, as Lt Gen Amir said in his conclusion, Ekeus's capacity for maneuvering, creating excuses, and raising new issues in the three files is now over. He does not have anything left.

It is now the missiles. His team came to look for missiles. In 1993, they spent a whole month and also brought a plane with them. Some 100 people spent one whole month in the western desert to look for missiles on the basis of information provided by the Pentagon. They only found rodents during that whole month.

They went to Jasim [not further identified], and do you know what he said? He said: We took them to a school at the airport. We had problems as we had to pass through the presidential lounges. They said: There are missiles in this school. They entered and did not find anything. They dug and searched with no avail. What does he [Ekeus] say now? He says there are still 20 missiles. He said this hundreds of times.

The biological file is still open, Sir. It has not been closed. They came in 1991 and 1992, inspected the sites: Al-Hakam and Al-Salman installations, took swipes, but found nothing.

They came the second time, took swipes and also found nothing. Now, their eyes are wide open on the biological file; I mean, the Russians, the French, and some Security

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Council members, including the Germans. Lt Gen Amir and Dr Riyad al-Qaysi went and met with the Germans.

Did the Germans raise with you any serious questions on the missile, chemical, or nuclear files? This is although the Germans are deeply involved in the Special Commission's work. In other words, the second effort after the American effort in the Special Commission, Sir, is the German effort. It is clear that these files are about to be settled.

I do not want to ask whether we should trust or not trust Ekeus. Regarding the point raised by comrade Al-Sahhaf that we paid a heavy price for playing the rules of the game, well we worked from July 1993, six months in the year 1993 and 12 months in 1994. These are 18 months and four months in the year 1995. In 22 months all the technicians, all the scientists, and all the administrators in the Special Commission, including the supporting diplomatic effort, led to this result.

We are not saying that there wasn't any work for him [Ekeus] to come again and open a new gap. There has been intensive and thorough work. It also became known to the equitable members of the Security Council.

Therefore, I said that if we resolved the biological file issue--let us see how long it will take and how it will be tackled--the French and the Russians would table their plan. Their plan would, of course, be discussed by the Americans who would nitpick, saying there is a point here and a point there, but we will ask for serious discussions.

On these serious discussions, Lt Gen Amir said something, which I do not agree with. He said that France is Ekeus. Yes, in the biological file, France is Ekeus.

But let us again produce from the Foreign Ministry's archives the speech by the French ambassador on the Security Council in January [year not given]. What did he say? He said it is unrealistic to look for perfection. It is not possible to reach a 100 percent result in any field. The main task of Ekeus and the Special Commission is that Iraq must not be left with banned weapons, which could pose a threat to security and stability in the region, he said.

This is a program, Sir. This is France's viewpoint. Ekeus' viewpoint differs here. Ekeus wants to reach the 100 percent result. This is his desire at the behest of the United States, and due to his own cowardice. As a person, he is a coward. He is not one of those international figures that say, I am convinced and this is where I stop.

For this reason, when I ask him a question, he gives me an answer. But when he goes there he maneuvers with his answers. But right now, he is in disagreement with the Russians and the French due to big gap in the biological field; a big gap.

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I support what the comrade foreign minister said. We played the rules of the game and paid the price, Sir. We paid the price. In 1991, our weapons were destroyed. We destroyed the whole nuclear program and they also destroyed it. We also destroyed the missiles with our hands and their hands. The main factories were destroyed.

There is only very little left of the rules of the game. So it is not in our interest to leave the rules now. This departure from the rules of the game should have taken place at the time when we did not make these sacrifices and did not carry out such intensive technical, political, and diplomatic work, and with this level of international understanding. There remained only small things.

On the biological subject, let the comrades give us in a technical session what had existed and how much time they expected was needed to accomplish it. Your Excellency gave one year in 1995. You asked that in your question.

[Saddam] Question?

[Aziz] Yes. According to my initial readings of the study before I, Lt Gen Husayn, and Lt Gen Amir came to see your Excellency, I don't think that this file would have taken a very long time if we presented it. It will not last a very long time. There will be a political battle, of course. And, I am not saying that there will not be a political battle.

Let us not forget the Americans and the British will continue to exploit this point on human rights and the biological issue. But do the others view things similarly? No, they don't. The others are convinced. I tell you now if you sit down with the French foreign minister you will find him convinced that Iraq no longer has anything that obstructs the implementation of Paragraph 22. He would say you have a problem facing you, so why don't you resolve it?

Why didn't they allow the technicians to meet with Lt Gen Amir in New York? This was because the French and Russian technicians supported the Special Commission's conclusions on the biological file.

What will Lt Gen Amir tell them? Would he tell them the mobs and I don't know what had removed some of them while others were distributed among the hospitals? They would tell him thank you, we are not convinced. So they avoided him. Did they not use to meet with you before, comrade Amir?

[Amir] All the ambassadors met with me.

[Al-Sahhaf] If the ambassador meets with you, why doesn't the technician meet with you? The French ambassador comes to me at any time I ask him. He comes out of the Security Council meeting and we meet. Every time I asked him to see you, he did. But they are not convinced of what you say.

[Amir] They are not convinced?

[Al-Sahhaf] And before we went to New York, they sent us a memo through Jordan, and they told Ahmad al-Azzawi directly: Your story is not convincing.

And now you want to go back the second time and repeat the same story? They will listen [laughing].

They used to listen to us and when we explained the other issues that Ekeus raised, such as the US suspicions of the missiles, the Russians were with them or were your talks baseless? The Iraqi reports are correct because they are indeed correct. But they are not convinced of this story. They say: You have something. Go ahead and resolve it and then come to us and take all the support you want.

[Saddam] Lieutenant General Husayn?

[Husayn] Thanks, Sir. I did not want to speak so openly were it not for your Excellency's raising and explaining the issue, and the statement by Tariq that we produced biological weapons.

We did not explain all we have. They can raise against us now or after one year or two three issues on the subject of the missiles. One is the place. The second is our work, which they don't know, on the subject of the missiles. Sir, this is my job and I know it very well. I have been at it for some time and it is not easy. The issues are much more dangerous than what they know. And I will explain them to you now.

On the subject of the chemical file, which we believe they will raise, we think that the biological file is the only problem. No, Sir, I believe that they have full details on the rockets, as well, if they want to raise them, as I said, because we have not finished with it.

It is possible, Sir, they have a problem that is a great deal bigger than the biological file: The types of weapons, the materials we imported, the product which we told them about, and the degree of their use. All of that was not correct. And all of them do not know. We did not say that we used them against Iran and we did not say the amount of chemical weapons we produced. We also did not say anything about the type of chemical weapons and the important materials in reality.

Therefore, Sir, if they want to raise problems the biological field will not be an excuse. No, Sir, I differ and I must be frank to you, I differ completely on this subject. They want one section after another. At present, they have not pressured us and we did not announce it.

Sir, I will go back and say it is better for us to decide whether to announce or not to announce it.

On the nuclear file, Sir, I mean on the biological file, we also differ with them, not only on the 17 tons; no, we have a well-known quantity. We have teams; a team working in the same direction while another does not know.

How could they not know, if they wanted? There are means for knowing that. We have materials that we imported from the United States and they know their quantity. We also have materials imported from Europe and they know their quantity also.

Therefore, Sir, if someone wants to create a problem, we have to be careful to find out: Does he want to make peace or create a new relationship quietly? No, Sir, I differ here.

On the nuclear file, Sir, we are saying that we disclosed everything? No, we have undeclared problems in the nuclear field, and I believe that they know them. Some teams work and no one knows some of them. Sir, I am sorry for speaking so clearly. Everything is over. But, did they know? No, Sir, they did not know; not all the methods, not all the means, not all the scientists, and not all the places.

Frankly, yes some activities were discovered. Even when we are here and your Excellency is aware that the biological file is the same, no, Sir, the biological file is the least and I am sorry to say the most insignificant. We must begin to talk with them, Sir, because the 17 tons are not the problem, but the thousands of tons here and the thousands of tons there and where did they go, how they were produced, and how they were used.

Really, Sir, we must be frank so that the resolution will be straightforward, and not biological in the afternoon, missiles the following morning, and nuclear the day after.

What Mr Tariq said about the French is correct. But he also said other things, which were discussed by Ekeus. Ekeus is not a good man in the Security Council. You say, what made you think that the Iraqi Army did not do this or that?

The French Ambassador in the Security Council said that. Sir, we are not impressed that he made that statement. The French, Sir, are tricky, really tricky.

Sir, I would like to go back to this subject: Do we have to reveal everything. If we continued with the silence, and if the meeting took this line, I must say that it is in our interest not to reveal anything. It is not out of fear of revealing the scientific technology we have acquired only, or concealing it for some future action; no; but the game, Sir, has taken too much time. It is now clear to many officials in the states that deal compulsorily with the United States, that they support Iraq and say that Iraq has responded adequately; in other words, we have not concealed anything.

Any signal and any acknowledgement that we produced biological weapons, there will come a time when we will have to say that we produced weapons, introduced this, and produced that. Fine, the 17 tons are over.

But, when, do you think, this problem will end so that they will say: Fine, we admitted it. So let us set aside all our previous problems and all our non-admissions of the missiles, the nuclear file, the chemical file, and the biological file. How much time, Sir, do we need?

Sir, we discussed it and Dr Amir actually and made good calculations. When can we contest this problem and say that we have finished and that Iraq has admitted and offered?

He [Ekeus] is the same man, Sir. He inspected the biological file and Al-Hakam factory. He did not leave anything unchecked. We told them that they have not left an air-conditioning unit, a water pipe, or a sewage pipe unearthed. Everything was checked. And he [Ekeus] created the biological file, which is being raised strongly anew.

The nuclear file, Sir, was defeated outside Iraq. Some of them know the details of our work. They went to the north in the past. In order to handle the matter properly, Sir, we must hold firmly. Why sir, because they can extend the time in which we admit everything for another five years without a solution. For five years, he [Ekeus] was inspecting, verifying, matching, and asking the driver how long it took him, and so on. He involved us with Iran saying, you used nuclear weapons against it. Ekeus will raise the whole story against us if he remained strong and the US stand remained strong.

All this will disappear even if we reached some type of missiles. I believe that he will not change the position of states.

But right now, Sir, I am convinced that neither Russia has development nor does France. France is very far behind. The Russian position could be much better.

On sympathy, Lt Gen Amir says that they do not want to reply. The French companies, which we are negotiating with now on precious contracts, are nervous. They did not come to us and we were annoyed. They express their desire on every subject, but in a nervous manner. This did not begin today. We began with them, Sir, since the first days after the aggression. After the anarchy, we established a link with the French. Up to this day we have not witnessed the slightest change among the French.

To be honest with you, Sir, I don't trust them. I don't have confidence in the French under their present position. There might be a change after the elections. But, under the present conditions, I find them further than China, although China is already very far. They appear in the Security Council to say sometimes yes and sometimes no.

According to my opinion, Sir, they have different chapters and they possibly coordinate with America and the world. Indeed, Sir, whenever a problem arises we find them with a different face, thus resolving the problem becomes more difficult than when it started. The settlement of any problem raised becomes more difficult when it began. If we differ on a machine, several other machines appear [as heard].

Going back to dealing with the Special Commission, Ekeus, the international situation, which is not normal, and the question of admitting the biological file, let us ask the specialists. We can imagine Ekeus holding on to the 17 tons and saying that we made this and that, and all the details we have. How long would it take to close this file?

It would not be closed in one year, Sir. This is the biological file alone. Fine, the closure will take a year and he will find out about how we produced and brought these missiles and ask: Are these yours? We have accepted many things. But are these facts? He accepted them as facts and included them in the files [indistinct words].

No, Sir, let us be frank to you. He can outbid us in all topics despite the efforts exerted by our people. It is one of the most difficult matters. But, if he has anything to raise against us, he can do it.

Our problems, Sir, will continue even if we admitted. As long as we do not admit, it will be plotting, Sir, in my opinion because it is not correct and we cannot say that this is correct that we admit the biological file. He could raise against us the items we bought from the United States; materials for the chemical weapons.

With just this one, the biological file, Sir, is very small.

He said that we admitted the different types of weapons. We did not admit them. We said that we tried to discuss them, but the fact is, it is not possible, Sir, under our present situation, to say that this is not correct. No, it is better to say that it is correct because the time to end the problem with Iraq will be a long one. This is how I see it, regrettably, Sir, but this is the fact. Thank you.

[Saddam] Comrade Taha [Yasin Ramadan]?

[Ramadan] I have a question, Sir, which your Excellency raised a while ago, but I will raise it once again in a different manner because the presence of the comrades is essentially to answer queries so that we can reach the full picture.

I am with those who ask: When we change our method of dealing, is it better for all or some members of the Security Council to be against us in this change? Certainly, it is not in our interest when we change our program, to see that all the council members united against us. I mean, it is in my opinion to avoid that.

If this requires one, two, or three months, I mean a few months, we can assume them. But if there is no prospect or time limit and there is the possibility of its extending with no guarantee, there must be two stands. I wash my hands of the American and British positions. I will not consider them at all.

If there is a prospect to achieve this picture, there must be two positions even in what is left of this year, which is long. In my opinion, it is wrong to waste time, even if our position is not convincing. We must stand on our feet when we want to change the current method of dealing so that there will be the possibility for pressure and influence.

Let us consider the present situation or the game, which the brothers called, and in which we continued for 22 months, it will not be much if it continued for 24 or 25 months.

We should take the present situation and consider the four files as finished, and that this small issue will not unite the states against us. Even if there is a [indistinct word] it will be a key for other states to stand against us.

Let us go back to the biological file. Time depends on how we deal with the other files because we heard in the Ekeus speech that [break in recording].

[Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri] I also said at that session that we must find another way to deal with not America but our friends first. We called them friends although they were not friends in the true sense of the word. They were produced by a conflict of interests in the international arena or a conflict between their interests and the interests of America and its allies. This is what made them stand by our side the way they are standing now. Now they have large interests. I mean all the countries standing by our side whether they are permanent or nonpermanent members [of the UN Security Council].

They accurately balance their loss and profit by escalating or decreasing their anti-US position. However, we have still not invested in this situation. I mean we have not tested our friends to see how far they would go in supporting us while serving their interests, that is, to what extent they would stand against America in defending their interests with regard to the issue of the embargo imposed on Iraq. We have not tested them. We are dealing with them with the same sensitivity with which we are dealing with America, our basic and major enemy.

The transformation took place more than a year ago. It was a large transformation in the position of France, Russia, China, and other known countries which are now at the Security Council. These are Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia, and even the other countries comrade Tariq mentioned like Germany and Italy.

We should exchange views with them now and speak to them all through direct meeting and on the highest level possible. We should tell them: We have reached an absolute conviction. What is your opinion? We even do not ask your opinion about this issue which we are going to tell you. We have an absolute conviction that America will not stop at a limit at which it will agree to lift the embargo imposed on Iraq because it wants the head of Iraq. It wants to erase Iraq from the map. We have reached this conviction.

We will explain to them our experience in figures over the past five years. We will tell them what we did and what America did and how much they helped us. We will tell them that there is a limit at which we must stop and cannot cooperate anymore. True, there are problems between us and Ekeus and the Security Council, but what we have given and the position we have reached now is at a rock-bottom level. We cannot endure more and our people have unanimously rejected this policy.

If no serious change takes place within the next few months or days in dealing with Iraq positively at the Security Council, we will abandon our commitment to the Security Council. Let what will happen then happen. Nothing worse than what has already happened will happen. What is present continues to exist unless the leadership reaches in an in-depth discussion [sentence incomplete as heard].

First, our conviction is that the majority of the leadership members and the majority of those interested -- or maybe I should not say interested because all the Iraqis are interested -- the majority of those working in this field, the field of the conflict and relationship with the Security Council and our political and diplomatic work on this issue, are certain that the issue of America and Ekeus, America and its entourage, America and its allies will continue to create technical problems. America will never allow this game to be played according to its purely technical rules and say everything is over and Iraq has done its work. America's strength and intelligence -- England and its strength and intelligence -- and its domination of the international community and its prestige and the world's fear of it -- the Russians and world are trembling [sentence incomplete].

China was the giant which disagreed with America whether justly or unjustly. No issue America abandons [words indistinct]. Now China is trembling in front of America. Will America, which enjoys all its strength and domination, not produce technical paragraphs and present them to the Council in this fragile manner as the Council members are discussing things?

It will continue to raise chemical and biological issues and missile and other issues. The day will come when it will persuade Russia, China, and France of the need to keep a certain resolution -- I do not memorize the number of resolutions, sir. I am referring to the resolution that speaks about the north, humanity, and the issue of the north in its Paragraph 22. [It will say] this is a basic issue because this regime is a regime of

criminals and it is not humanitarian and it is destroying mankind. Therefore, let us add a paragraph if this is not achieved in five, six, two, or three years. If America is forced to implement [Paragraph] 22 it will add this paragraph and say funds under this paragraph should be spent this way. The Russians and French will then come and say this is a humanitarian and legitimate issue and there is nothing wrong about it. They would then say: You must accept this resolution or this trend.

In my view, our people still have this high morale and good psychological mood before things get out of our hands. The good things will get out of our hands and will then [words indistinct]. This means our fight will be strong -- it is not a fight because we do not want to fight others. We want to express the truth, which is supported by God. We want to express our freedom, which is supported by God. We want to express our personal rights, which are supported by God. We want to express all the principles God supports. God is stronger than America and the entire globe. We do not want to mass armies and go to fight America. We refuse to cancel all our decisions with which we complied to the Security Council. We will tell our friends and meet with the Russians and tell them: We have reached this limit in our convictions, understanding, and determination. We will make such a decision if things at the Security Council continue to take this course. You are friends and this is a legitimate right which you understand deep inside yourselves, but for considerations pertaining to international politics and relations with America, and perhaps because you think Iraq can continue bleeding for another two or three years in this manner, we [word indistinct] lift the embargo. This means you [Russians] are not giving much attention to this issue. We want a serious and effective position from you in this direction. We want you to support our position. Let them answer us in whatever fashion they want. We should tell this to the French, Chinese, and all other countries we reach and the Arab front. We should say this to all the countries we can reach -- Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, Qatar, and all countries, except for Saudi Arabia.

It is also possible to issue a national Iraqi statement by the historic Iraqi leadership announcing this to the Arab nation and calling on the people of Saudi Arabia and the Arab people in Kuwait to strongly stand by our side on this issue. We will also undertake strong official, diplomatic, and popular mobilization of efforts for this purpose on the level of the country, the Arab homeland, and the whole world. We will take such a position if we do not reach a full and documented agreement -- as some comrades said -- between us and the French, Russians, and Chinese -- the three big ones -- and other allies.

The agreement is: If this issue is solved or if we pledge to solve it, the embargo will be lifted next month. This means Paragraph 22 will then be implemented. If America rejects this through its veto or disapproval, you will then implement it. America will then be rebelling against the spirit of the Security Council resolutions.

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If they agree on this, we will seriously look into the biological file. We will solve it. If they say no, we cannot and this is not possible and we need to see what we can do, we will then adopt another position.

This is my opinion. Before we adopt another position, we need time to work for this mobilization and these contacts to the maximum and in an open manner so that the whole world will know that we will take a stand if the Security Council does not respond to us.

[Saddam] If it does not respond?

[Al-Duri] Yes, if it does not respond to us. This is my opinion, Mr President.

[Saddam] Comrade Mizban [Khadr Hadi]?

[Hadi] Leader president, from my reading of the Foreign Ministry's cables I did not see pressure on Ekeus by the Security Council member states and even our friends. On the contrary, they always underscore the need to implement the Security Council's resolutions.

With regard to the rules of the game -- and they are many -- I believe -- on the basis of my analysis -- that they are concentrating on the economic aspect. It is possible that from the economic aspect they can issue something, but they will lose, God willing, thanks to your presence.

Mr President, an analysis of the position of the European states and the Security Council shows that a discussion was held on Resolution 678 and particularly Resolution 715. A large discussion was held on Resolution 715 in the hope that the embargo will be lifted one day or one month after our approval of this resolution.

Discussions continued and they raised the issue of recognizing Kuwait and the Kuwaiti borders. Discussions continued. We recognized 715 and then Kuwait and then the borders. We did not get any result.

In my view, there is nothing in the horizon even if we did everything. They want to play the game according to other rules. They concentrated on the economic aspect. As the comrade vice president [Izzat Ibrahim] noted, will they discuss the issue of lifting the embargo imposed on Iraq if we accept the new proposed issue?

Now they say in their cables: You will see that when we put pressure on Iraq, it responds to the Security Council pressures. Recently [words indistinct] your Excellency and the comrade technicians, if we recognize, would not they come back with more demands, as comrade Husayn said? I believe that they will raise other issues that are on their mind.

I do not want to speak much because the comrades spoke about this aspect. There should be a political position by the leadership on the issue of activity. We need to tell them that they still have a monitoring body and nothing new happened to make them object to Iraq's development of the technological or industrial sector. Mr President, their game has many rules.

Therefore, the leadership must take a position in this regard. If we do not take this position, they will continue to raise many issues. They focus their game on the economic aspect to hurt our people at a time when the people have the ability to fight and stand. However, if this continues in the future for more or less than one year, we may not get the result we may get in any confrontation now or in the near future.

I believe this issue needs to be studied deeply and comprehensively by your Excellency and a balanced decision be issued according to which we can work with friends so that they will not support the Americans when they make a decision on any confrontation with us nor participate as they participated in the new resolution. Thank you, sir.

[Saddam] Comrade Muhammad?

[Muhammad; not further identified] Thank you, leader president. Actually, sir, I do not want to repeat what comrade vice president and comrade Ali [not further identified] said about the suffering which has actually started to affect our people. The living conditions have started to gradually affect our people. There is scarcity of food and medicine. The ration card plays a basic role in checking these things, but the fact is that the comrades mentioned this issue and I fully support them in saying that our people are now in need of [better] living and medical conditions.

Sir, the consensus noted during the latest Security Council's session harmed us greatly. Statements were made by Russia, France, and others that this resolution was adopted in agreement with Iraq. Of course, when the Iraqi leadership's decision was made and became our decision, it became clear to the whole world that the text was not as it was in the past. [Words indistinct by another speaker mentioning the name of Husam Muhammad Amin; former director general of the National Monitoring Directorate] I heard this in the news. It was carried by [words indistinct].

[An unidentified speaker, interrupting] The Security Council president made a statement after meeting with Tariq [Aziz], in which he said it was possible after the amendment [words indistinct].

[Muhammad] Yes, comrade Tariq denied that later.

[Unidentified speaker] He is the president of the Security Council.

[Another unidentified speaker] A Russian statement said the resolution was issued in agreement with Iraq [words indistinct].

[Unidentified speaker] They perhaps said it is in the interest of Iraq to [words indistinct].

[Muhammad] The fact I want to underscore -- actually there has been some ambiguity about the statements as [name indistinct] said -- is that in my view I do not think it will be in our interest to raise any problem with Ekeus now. I think this will only further complicate things.

Ekeus has now won the confidence of the Security Council. If we want to complicate things, we will take a position or make a decision against Ekeus and against the Security Council resolutions. I believe that at this stage, it will not be in our interest to maintain things as they are until the US election campaign. I do not think this will be in our interest at this stage.

Therefore, if the comrade technicians and the Foreign and Information Ministries are certain of these things as one of the comrades said, let this machine be with the other machines [as heard] and let us get rid of the problems that remain in a certain way an obstacle.

Therefore, I think we should deal with this issue wisely and patiently. We must really consider our people's interests at this stage and their suffering.

The other point I would like to stress is that I absolutely support a quick action to improve relations with the Arab countries. I do not think it will be in our interest to keep the current situation as it is at this stage. We will welcome those who respond except for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, of course. As for the rest, I support contacts with all Arab countries in order to restore relations with them in any acceptable formula. The game is now clear on the international level and our general situation.

Therefore, it is essential to take a quick political and diplomatic action worldwide, that is, in the Arab and foreign countries in order to at least win their support at this stage and try by all means to break the embargo imposed on our people. Thank you.

[Unidentified speaker] Sir, there is a very difficult question from which we are suffering. It is a difficult question. We cannot give guarantees. Actually, and in our conviction, there are no guarantees for any case. Such rules [sentence incomplete; noise due to movements of chairs in the room].

Sir, the question is whether other files will be closed or opened if we, for example, give up the biological file.

This is the question. How will our credibility be affected?

Sir, I will comment on this issue if you allow me. This is the question worrying us. Much will certainly be raised about our credibility [words indistinct] the Security Council regarding other issues. We are living with these things while talking about this issue.

Sir, the observation I made is the following: They have now succeeded in proving our incredibility with regard to the information provided in the biological file. The probability that the Security Council or any moderate side even in the Special Commission will say that Iraq has fulfilled its commitments in accordance with Paragraph 22 on closing files is nil. It has become nil. We need to explain the technical aspect of the issue with measured flexibility under guidance in such a way that settles this issue within the shortest possible time.

This, of course, also requires a political cover because if we leave [words indistinct] within this framework without a political cover in terms of notifying our friends in advance or negotiating with Ekeus politically before discussing the issue technically.

[Sentence incomplete as heard] Actually, this requires calculation and technical flexibility on our part because when we say everything or something is incorrect, we have ideas that need time to be expressed so that we can open subjects giving high credibility to our position and at the same time shortening time to the minimum possible. If we talk about everything, this will take us perhaps one year or one and a half years. Some of the figures mentioned are absolutely not far from the truth about their possible occurrence. With the flexibility of the technical side, I feel that probability will remain good in return for a zero probability now in terms of cost and influence. Thank you, sir.

[Saddam] Lieutenant General Husayn [not further identified]?

[Husayn] Thank you, sir. A report we submitted last year directly clarified facts. Allow me, sir, to read paragraphs from it because it has to do with their tricks.

Sir, with regard to the issue of missiles in particular, which is not a deciding factor, let us see what they did. We said: The file of this issue was closed at the end of 1992 and once again in 1993. Sir, in 1992 we destroyed a large plant specialized in manufacturing solid fuel missiles. We also destroyed many components of the liquid fuel missiles. Nevertheless, when the Special Commission felt that the issue of recognizing Kuwait would be resolved, it began to repeat questions and issues in a detailed and provocative manner more than ever before. We, sir, finished with the issue of missiles, but after recognizing Kuwait, they began to raise it again. Directly after the crisis, the Special Commission adopted more extremist methods. It returned to the file of the previous program as if starting again from scratch.

[Saddam] Bring us tea and milk.

[Unidentified speaker] Yes, sir.

[Husayn] It [Special Commission] asked for supporting documents, concentrating on asking secondary and trivial questions. That what was left with it in order to create suspended points and thus achieve a political aim, which is perhaps reaching the conclusion that some equipment was imported especially for the previous program, something which might expose it to destruction.

As for the issue of destruction, it had been resolved earlier in 1992 when a large percentage of the equipment of the industrial base for solid fuel missile engines -- all Bilat al-Shuhada plants -- was destroyed as well as secondary machinery at another project for the missile structures after accepting Resolution 715. Sir, in 1993, Ekeus stressed that the issue of destroying any additional machines was over. That was what he said. He told us there would be no destruction of additional machines.

[Saddam] What year?

[Husayn] In 1993. That was after our acceptance of Resolution 715 on the issue of missiles. He said these would only be subjected to monitoring. This is what really happened.

However, the Special Commission began to raise the issue of the Chinese radar. We, sir, brought the Chinese radar very late. We did not even use it for the missiles. It is radar for distant detection. They said it had to do with the missiles although we did not use the missiles. Therefore, they destroyed it. We obtained your Excellency's approval, and they destroyed the Chinese radar after we had accepted Resolution 715. All these things, sir, happened after [recognizing] Kuwait. The measure was taken about this as directed by your Excellency.

Two days ago, the head of the inspection team raised the possibility of demanding the destruction of a number of important and vital machines used in manufacturing parts of the missile engines. This issue, sir, was closed in 1992. They then raised it again in 1993. After [recognizing] Kuwait, we destroyed the Chinese radar. We were (blamed?) again. The head of the inspection team said it was possible to manufacture parts of liquid fuel missile engines. The solid fuel was over and they returned here to the liquid fuel. This is currently under monitoring pending what the inspection team will present to Ekeus in New York.

We believe that the Special Commission went too far in its behavior. What we discussed above with regard to the missile activity, is an example of its position which began in a new form, particularly after our recognition of Kuwait.

There are other problems in the chemical and biological fields. We are trying to contain them so that they will not be used as an excuse.

Sir, these are the points. They came to the biological file. Sir, this is the missile's story [as heard] before your Excellency. We, sir, did this on 18 December 1994. There is a report. It is clear, sir that they keep silent for some time, but then return and speak up. Ekeus told us that after accepting Resolution 715, he would not destroy any machine.

Monitoring is over. We all understood that monitoring will replace destruction. When we complain about their destruction of a site, they say: What shall we do? You have not recognized Resolution 715. [Recording ends abruptly at this point]